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HSE Review into HSE's Conduct of Prosecutions, 2000
Back to Index on Prosecution Review 2000
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Independent Legal Oversight

If you are interested to read in more details about the issue of Independent Legal Oversight and the way the HSE has dealt with it, click here. This page sets out what the Prosecution Review said about it.

In its conclusion, the review team specifically considered whether the role of inspector as both investigator and prosecutor should continue. It stated.

4.3 A separation of the investigation/ prosecution function was recommended by the Philips’ Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 1981. The CPS was set up in 1986 to prosecute cases investigated by the police, following the Philips’ recommendations. This split in functions, sometimes referred to as ‘the Philips principle’ was to promote independence of the prosecutor - to ensure that police investigations were assessed by an independent person.
4.4

The Philips’ Report sets out the characteristics which a prosecution system should possess at paragraph 6.8.

"Is the system fair; first, in the sense that it brings to trial only those against whom there is an adequate and properly prepared case and who it is in the public interest should be prosecuted (that is, tried by a court) rather than dealt with in another way (by cautioning, for example), and secondly, in that it does not display arbitrary and inexplicable differences in the way that individual cases are treated locally or nationally? Is it open and accountable in that those who make the decision to prosecute or not can be called publicly to explain and justify their policies and actions as far as that is consistent with protecting the interests of the suspects and the accused? Is it efficient in the sense that it achieves the objectives that are set for it with the minimum use of resources and the minimum delay? Each of these standards makes its own contribution to what we see as being the single overriding test of a successful system. Is it of a kind to have and does it in fact have the confidence of the public it serves?"

4.5 Philips recognised that there is an interdependence between the investigator and prosecutor, with the need for close cooperation and working arrangements. The recent Gower/Hammond Review of Prosecutions endorsed the ‘Philips principle’ and recommended that the solicitor/client relationship between the Solicitor and the Commissioners of Customs and Excise should cease in relation to the Solicitor’s prosecution functions. ‘The decision whether or not to prosecute is a legal one and should be taken by a lawyer after seeking the views of an administrator on matters of policy and public interest.’ Gower/Hammond also endorsed the interdependence between the investigator and the prosecutor highlighted in Philips and recognised that this need for investigators and prosecutors to work closely together should be taken into account in developing an efficient and practical model.
4.6 The position in HSE is not directly analogous to that in Customs and Excise. HSE cases can be straightforward and not involve complex matters of law, evidence and unused material which can be present in the large scale drug importation or VAT fraud cases brought by Customs. But equally some HSE cases are very specialist and highly technical, and involve issues of major public interest. Gower/Hammond made it plain that, while the Philips criteria constitute the proper objectives of a criminal justice system, it would be wrong to regard them as ‘Shibboleth’, that is a set of rules which must always be followed to the letter if a criminal justice system is to command the confidence of the public.
4.7 Although Gower/Hammond recommended that Customs and Excise investigating officers should not have rights of audience in the magistrates’ court, the review recognised that this change would take a significant period to implement. The review suggested that in the transitional period, it might be practicable for investigating officers to present cases but to be answerable and report to a lawyer in the Solicitor's Office.
4.8 We therefore considered how the ‘Philips principle’ should best be applied within the context of HSE, building on the key role of the inspector but at the same time ensuring independent oversight of prosecutions, in order to deliver the necessary elements of fairness, accountability and efficiency which a prosecution agency should demonstrate.


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Page last updated on April 8, 2004